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1. Introduction 
Since the introduction of the solar home system (SHS) concession programme in 1999, the involved 
companies and customers have had to adapt to many changes over the years. Government introduced 
for example the Free Basic Electricity policy in alongside the SHS subsidy and only irregularly 
awarded tenders for the actual installation of SHSs; companies have split and concession areas have 
been renegotiated. Despite these changing conditions some companies have managed to stay in 
business and are still willing to install systems for new customers. The questions are: who managed 
to adapt to these changes, and what do the business models of the companies look like?  
Rural electrification remains a challenge for government and the private sector. High connection 
costs, low consumption rates and high poverty rates constrain the roll-out of electricity in rural areas. 
The SHS concession programme was introduced with the objective to „speed up universal access to 
electricity‟, and aimed to „attract larger, better organised private companies with their own sources 
of financing‟ in the hope that „the strong financial and maintenance control characteristic of the 
private sector should facilitate the channelling of international development funding‟. The 
programme was also meant to motivate the service providers to „adopt a delivery model that 
promotes a range of fuels such as gas or kerosene, in addition to SHS or mini-grid systems‟ (Kotze, 
2000). 
Earlier research has been helpful in identifying shortcomings of the programme (for example Energy 
Research Centre, 2005 and Energy Research Centre, 2004) but, in order to advise policy makers, it is 
of particular interest to examine the survival strategies the SHS companies adopted.  
2. Research approach and information collection 
methods 
A survey of the SHS companies was carried out. The approach is a research methodology, which 
interrogates the collected data both qualitatively and quantitatively. The data were analysed both for 
their qualitative insight as well as their quantitative information, to provide a framework to review 
current business models and practices. In the survey, respondents were asked to rank the quality of 
earlier identified key elements of their work in the concession areas, which provides the basis for 
comparison between the respondents.  
The survey consisted of interviews with the concession manager, guided by a questionnaire 
including open questions. Out of the seven concession companies, six are still operating and 
participated in this research. The survey which was conducted in personal conversations with the 
concession managers was followed up by email conversations with some of them. Only one 
concession company could not be met with in person and was therefore interviewed by an emailed 
questionnaire. Further, a semi-structured interview was conducted with the manager of the non-grid 
electrification programme of the Department of Energy, followed up by email correspondence. 
Knowledge was also shared by other experts in the field. 
3. The current state of affairs in the different 
companies 
There are six concession companies in the country, of which three are devoted to maintenance for 
the existing customers in the areas allocated to them and three are, as well as providing maintenance 
service, installing systems for new customers. The three maintenance-only companies have each 
taken over parts of the concession area the Eskom-Shell concession company was initially working 
in. Two of these new concession companies were not operating at the time of the research.  
3.1 Solar Vision 
Operation area 
Solar Vision has been involved with the SHS program from the outset and is today servicing 
customers in four municipalities Of the 11 500 installed systems, about 4 000 households have 
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received grid electricity meanwhile, and their systems have been removed, vandalised, stolen or sold 
by the households. Solar Vision says it has 6500 remaining customers at present.  
Points of contact with customers 
Solar Vision runs two “solar shops” in the Venda district where LPG, improved wood stoves, 
paraffin, light bulbs for the SHSs and also electricity and airtime are sold. One retail shop in the 
Polokwane area also belongs to the company. Solar Vision has competition, particularly when it 
comes to selling LPG from their shop. Although selling them is not very profitable, airtime and 
electricity have been added to the shops‟ product range with the aim of making the name Solar 
Vision better known. 
Maintenance of existing systems 
The maintenance of the SHSs is done using cars which can drive on the often very poor road almost 
to all houses of the customers. Solar Vision receives about 10-15 maintenance calls per 1000 
customers per day which adds up to over 1800 maintenance calls per month, although not all of these 
calls relate to actual technical problems. Within the first week after a problem has been reported, 
about 60% of the problems can be attended to and resolved. The rest can take up to 4-6 weeks, 
depending on the availability of spare parts. Customers either call Solar Vision directly or report 
technical faults to one of the technicians in the field or at the solar shops.  
The team 
Solar Vision started off with six employees and is today staffed with 18 permanent staff members 
and has access to 5-7 contract installers and 20 representatives of the company throughout the 
concession area. Of the 18 staff members, 4 are female. 
Collaboration with municipalities 
Solar Vision perceives the relationship between the municipalities and the company as good. The 
municipalities pay regularly, except in one case where the payment is currently three months 
overdue. The municipalities pay R40 per month per customer and the customers add R28 to this 
amount. In case of non-payment by customers, Solar Vision follows up on the household and usually 
finds that the house has received grid electricity or has damaged the system somehow without 
reporting it to the company. The SHS is then usually removed or the outstanding fees claimed. 
Electrification 
The state‟s aim to provide access to grid electricity for everybody by 2012 not only threatening the 
business of Solar Vision, but would make the SHS program as a whole redundant. The 
municipalities Solar Vision is collaborating with are hoping to reach universal access in due course.  
Even if the municipalities will not be able to deliver on their promises, Eskom‟s electrification 
process is an issue for Solar Vision, while delays and a lack of transparency are a challenge for the 
planning. Solar Vision says that municipalities and Eskom are not being honest when it comes to 
defining dates for the electrification of newly-built houses and settlements, especially when it comes 
to urban settlements. The company sees the service of SHSs as a good opportunity for government to 
provide service to people who still have to wait years for a connection to the grid.   
Future of Solar Vision 
Solar Vision considers SHS as their core business and hopes to be able to continue its work through 
more contracts. (Jakes Jacobs, 2010). Solar Vision has been awarded a new contract for new 
installations in the municipalities Mpane and Greater Sequma. Since Norwegian funding came to an 
end last year, the company is open to new external funders.  
3.2 Nura  
Nura is the second company which has been active as a concession company right from the start. 
Nura was awarded the initial roll out for SHSs and a second ad hoc rollout of 2000 systems was 
made possible by their Dutch funders, Nuon, in order to prevent Nura from going bankrupt. Nura 
was shrinking and running out of storage room, as they had to remove many systems from 
customers‟ houses and find storage space. In order to prevent having to invest in more storage room, 
Nuon financed the reinstallation of these 2000 systems to new and old customers to prevent Nura 
from running out of money. 
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Operation area  
Nura is currently active in six municipalities in eastern Kwazulu-Natal by providing maintenance.   
Points of contact with customers 
Nura is running eight energy shops in the concession area, selling the Stovetec improved woodstove 
which has not been taken up very well, SHSs, LPG and the successful Ethanol fuel. As government 
regulates LPG, Nura‟s margin on LPG is low, which makes it almost unviable for them to sell it. All 
these products are sourced from inside South Africa, except the Stovetec woodstoves which are from 
China and were introduced to Nura by GTZ and Restio Energy. 
Nura is preparing another shop which should be open by the end of August. Their shop in Jizana is 
moving into a bigger space. 
Maintenance of existing systems 
The service agreements between Nura and its customers are renewed every year and it is generally 
seen as difficult to keep the customers happy and the relationship with municipalities positive. 
Especially the poorest of their customers struggle to pay the monthly service fees for the SHS and 
find themselves often occurring substantial debts with Nura.  
Nura installed two different SHS systems - one including a pre-payment meter which switches off in 
case of non-payment, the other a stand-alone system which requires manual disconnection. Nura 
offers two options for customers who continually fail to pay their monthly fees. Firstly, there is a 
chance to enter the amnesty programme whereby the payment of the amount of only one monthly fee 
wipes off their outstanding debts. The second option includes a two-step removal process. 
Customers receive first a letter noting non-payment, then monthly SMSs informing them about their 
outstanding balance; later the panel gets removed and if the reinstallation fees are not paid the rest of 
the system gets removed as well. Nura has about a 40% rate of customers who continually fail to pay 
their fees.  
The maintenance of the SHS systems is supported by a geographic information system which helps 
to locate customers and in organising the logistics. The maintenance call which is longest 
outstanding and the houses in the immediate surrounding are serviced in one go. Nura receives about 
700 maintenance calls per month, many of which might not necessarily relate to faulty systems, but 
rather to other problems in the houses. Customers either call Nura‟s cell-phone or report to the 
technicians in the field or in the stores. It takes about one month to solve a technical problem, 
depending on the availability of spare parts. Nura only started raising the customer‟s service fees in 
2007, and in 2010 households pay R74 per month. 
The maintenance team use motorbikes, allowing them to reach almost all customers without needing 
to walk. The usage of motorbikes is reported to challenge technicians (both female and male), as the 
roads are rough and many employees only recently learnt to ride a two-wheel vehicle (Dlamini, 
2010). 
The team 
Nura is following a careful but constant growth path which is described by the manager as intrinsic - 
meaning that it has only slowly added shops (which are situated not more than 50km apart to prevent 
isolation of shops and ease logistics). There are currently 82 staff members, who have joined the 
team over time. Of these about 40% are located in Mkuze, and around 40% are female. There has 
been a shift in management since 2006, as Nura‟s management has since become located in Mkuze. 
The current manager, who joined the company in 2004, feels this change of location is important for 
the success of Nura. 
Collaboration with municipalities 
Collaboration with municipalities is also problematic for Nura. Only one municipality is currently 
paying the monthly subsidy in a regular manner, the other five consistently failing to pay. Customers 
in these municipalities have to pay the full amount of the monthly service fees. 
Electrification  
Nura finds Eskom‟s electrification plans are insufficiently transparent, and wishes that at least the 
municipalities could have a better understanding of Eskom‟s plans. Nura constantly tries to engage 
directly with Eskom, but is not satisfied with the information received. On the other hand, Nura says 
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it has a fair understanding of what is possible with the current grid-infrastructure, and is therefore 
fairly knowledgeable about what to expect in terms of electrification in the future. 
Future of Nura 
SHSs are part of Nura‟s core business. The business is constantly growing through volume, range of 
products, number of employees and revenue, though less through customer growth, although that 
should happen now through a new contract. Nura has been awarded a new contract by the DOE for 
the installation of 4000 additional SHS systems. While welcoming this, Nura thinks the business 
could have continued surviving even without it (as has since 2006 without new installations). New 
customers for this roll-out will be found through community meetings, announcements in the 
community radio, and advertisements in the shops. The systems have to be installed in the current 
financial year - which is a challenge, given that the contract was only been signed in July, after 
which Nura immediately started tendering for the technical supply.  
Nura likes to be an example for other projects and has been the subject of international studies. It is  
happy to share information and experiences to support other projects. Projects which fail are 
seriously damaging to the reputation of PV and, with PV becoming more and more viable with 
increasing electricity tariffs and declining technology costs, any failure should be prevented if 
possible. Nura‟s manager expects the costs of PV and grid-electricity to balance out in around 2015. 
Rising battery costs prolong the price reduction, associated with the technological learning curve.  
3.3 Summer Sun Trading 
Summer Sun Trading is managed by Colin Ferrel who runs two other businesses beside Summer 
Sun, a car repair service and a commercial solar appliances installation company.  He carries the risk 
for the company, while profit is meant to be shared between the management and the employees. 
Operation area 
Summer Sun Trading stopped operating in February 2010. The company was initially allocated 1200 
SHS customers located in five municipalities. The Hibiscus district received grid electricity and the 
systems were removed from the houses; Umuziwabantu used to have 240 customers, but 170 
systems were removed here due to electrification as well; the municipality of Bizana has recently 
decided to not continue paying the subsidy for 350 of the 500 SHS customers in their area and they 
were consequently excluded from the company‟s maintenance service. From the remaining two 
municipalities of Flagstaff and Umzumbi the company has never received any payments.  
Maintenance of existing systems 
Summer Sun Trading used to supply its customers with the SHS-specific light bulbs. The customers 
were meant to pay different fees depending on the municipality they belong to. Bizana‟s customers 
are meant to pay R10, Flagstaff‟s R13 and in Umzumbi the municipality promised to pay the full 
amount of R61 per customer. 
The team 
The team, nine people in 2004, now consists of seven people who are currently on short time.  
Collaboration with municipalities 
The collaboration with the municipalities is as mentioned before the main reason for Summer Sun 
Trading ceasing operations. The Bizana municipality took seven months to organise its indigent 
register and saw itself unable to pay while doing so. In July 2010 when the Bizana municipality 
finally paid they only paid for 150 out of the 500 existing customers in their area. They did not state 
a reason for selecting these 150 and Summer Sun Trading is therefore assuming that the 350 
customers for whom payments were missing had not been accepted as indigent. From two other 
municipalities payment  was received, with a delay of many months.  
Electrification 
Before Summer Sun Trading stopped operating, the manager described Eskom as a constraint 
because it was communicating false information. According to him Eskom declares areas to be 
electrified without actually having electrified all the houses in the area. When this issue is brought to 
the attention of the municipalities, their reaction is in general that if Eskom declares an area as 
electrified, there is nothing a municipality can do.  
A review of the solar home system concession programme in South Africa 7  
ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE 
The future of Summer Sun Trading 
As Summer Sun Trading is currently not active and its staff on short time, the focus of the manager 
and its team is on the two other commercial businesses run by the manager.  
Summer Sun Trading had been waiting for the municipalities to pay their debts and since some 
money had come in is now planning on sending staff into the areas to collect the fees of the 
customers or remove the systems if customers are unable or unwilling to pay. The systems could 
then be sold and installed somewhere else. 
The customers often understand that Summer Sun Trading is not able to service the systems without 
the municipalities paying the agreed monthly fees. Some of their customers are starting to ask now 
for Summer Sun Trading to sell them new batteries instead of giving them out for free.   
The manager of Summer Sun Trading used to manage the Eskom-Shell concession and has been 
involved in writing the business plan for the three maintenance companies which were meant to take 
on the maintenance service of Eskom-Shell‟s customers. This plan already showed that without 
additional contracts for new installations the businesses would not be able to sustain themselves for 
long.  
3.4 Ilitha co-operative 
Operation area  
Ilitha Co-operation Ltd is managed by Gibson Mzenzi and is one of three companies awarded the 
contract for maintenance of the installed SHS under the Eskom-Shell concession licence. Ilitha 
started negotiating with the municipalities in 2004 and is responsible for the customers in the 
municipalities of Matatiele, Umzimvubu and Umzimkulu. The customers in the Elundini 
municipality should also be maintained by Ilitha, but the municipality only agreed to subsidize 42 of 
the 181 customers and later reduced this to only six customers. Ilitha stopped servicing the area 
subsequently and the 181 customers remain un-serviced. 
Maintenance of existing systems 
Of the 1 852 total customers Ilitha co-operative was contracted to service, 219 houses have been 
electrified and 72 systems stolen, so that 1561 customers remain. The 219 electrified houses have 
been found with either vandalised or stolen systems; and in few cases the households are still using 
the SHS‟s as a backup.  
Customers can visit the reporting point, call, SMS or send „call me‟ messages in order to report 
faulty systems. It takes Ilitha between two and four weeks to visit houses which reported problems. 
It receives 20-30 maintenance calls per month.  
The initial service under the Eskom-Shell concession included the provision and exchange of broken 
lightbulbs suitable for the SHS. The maintenance contracts for Ilitha and the other two companies do 
not now, however, include this service. As these special 9-Watt bulbs are not available in the local 
shops, Ilitha sells the bulbs to its customers. 
Ilitha sources its supplies from Sky Solar in Cape Town and batteries from First Election Batteries in 
East London.  
The team 
The initial team consisted of nine people 2004, of which three left and have not been replaced. The 
remaining team consists of the project manager, a secretary, two main technicians and two assistant 
technicians. The team is underutilised and two of them are only working as assistants when footwork 
is required. The team is well trained, according to the manager, as most of them worked for the 
Eskom-Shell concession before. Ilitha has access to two bakkies - which are often broken due to the 
bad road conditions. Technicians usually drive to a central point like a shop and walk from there 
with the equipment for the maintenance. 
Electrification 
Ilitha is working on Eskom to release more information about their future electrification plans and 
the DOE‟s involvement should help to push Eskom towards this. 
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Collaboration with municipalities 
The three remaining municipalities where Ilitha is servicing customers are not paying the service 
fees regularly. After the demarcation in 2006, customers in Matatiele were split and 235 were re-
allocated to Umzimvubu. Matatiele has not been paying Ilitha for one year and is currently paying 
irregularly for 911 of the 912 existing customers. Umzimvubu has not been paying for 14 month for 
their 235 customers. Only Umzimkulu is a regular payer for its 233 customers. The municipalities 
are all meant to pay around R48 per month per customer; with the remaining R13 to be paid by the 
customers.  
The households, however, pay whatever they can afford when their system needs maintenance. The 
visiting technician collects the money on the day they are working at a system. There is no regular 
collecting system for the monthly fees as Ilitha feels that the households appear to not comply with 
monthly payments anyway. Ilitha does not switch off systems or remove them in the case of non-
payment. The business model does not rely on customer payments, but on the subsidy paid to Ilitha 
by the municipalities.  
One of the municipalities‟ requests Ilitha to send them the monthly maintenance reports with their 
invoice. This is welcomed by the company.  
The future of IlithaC o-operative 
The manager of Ilitha is running an accounting practice as well, and so is able to survive. Ilitha is 
running at a high loss and he talks of “God‟s influence” for his hopes that the situation will improve. 
Ilitha has been awarded a new contract under which they will be allocated additional areas in which 
they will also be allowed to install new systems in future. The areas have not been allocated yet, but 
it is expected that work should begin in October 2010. Ilitha hopes to add 3000 new customers to 
their list and hopes, too, for better collaboration with the municipalities.  
“Umkomazi”, an area which will never receive electricity according to Ilithas information, is likely 
to be part of their area. Here 200 households are relatively close together; which should help with the 
collection of fees and the organisation of maintenance. 
3.5 Kwazulu Energy Services 
Operation area 
Kwazulu Energy Services (KES) is owned by TED, EDF and Calulo and managed by Vicky Basson. 
It operates in Mount Fletcher, Tsomo, Msinga, Maphumulo and Ndwedwe. Initially (1998) the 
company focused on KwaZulu Natal, and has expanded through a Tender by the Kreditbank fuer 
Wiederaufbau and the Department of Energy to the Eastern Cape in 2005. In total KES has installed 
and is servicing 10000 SHSs. 
Point of contact with customers 
KES runs one energy store in each area of operation, and there it sells SHSs, improved woodstoves, 
and LPG - which is the only product where sales are decreasing. For a new SHS customers have to 
pay R105 once off and subsequently the monthly maintenance fees. 
Maintenance of existing systems 
The total monthly costs for maintenance are R74; in some areas the customers pay the whole 
amount, in other areas up to half of this amount is paid for by the municipalities. The money is 
collected at the energy stores, as most of the households are located 2-5 kilometres from a shop. 
However, 21-50% of the customers permanently fail to pay the fees. In these cases, KES is open to 
arrangements like special individual payment schedules. In the worst case, the SHS is removed from 
the house.  
The team 
The continuously growing team consists of 66 employees for the moment (including 20 women). 
The staff and subcontractors are stated to all be „local‟. Installation and maintenance of SHS is seen 
as KESs core business. 
Electrification 
KES did not rate the collaboration with Eskom as they have only recently started engaging with 
Eskom directly, communication having previously been conducted through the municipalities. 
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Collaboration with municipalities 
KES states that they are generally satisfied with the collaboration with the municipalities. 
The future of Kwazulu Energy Service 
The company seems to be on a constant growth path, with product volume, the number of employees 
and the generated revenue increasing. The manager states that the activities falling under the DOE 
project in the company depend on two things. On the one hand, the project needs to be implemented 
properly, and on the other hand a new tender for more installations needs to be prepared in time to 
keep the business going, because the DOE tends to need up to one year after the contract is signed to 
confirm the areas for implementation.  
3.6 Shine the Way 
Shine the way in the Estern Cape was reported to be no longer operating and could not be contacted. 
According to Summer Sun Trading and Ilitha Co-operative, the company stopped being active in the 
concession business due to financial problems. 
4. Interview with Sebastian Khoza (Department of 
Energy) 
The role of the off-grid manager is to collaborate with Eskom and the team from DOE‟s grid 
programme in order to align the work of the off-grid programme with future national electrification 
plans. The double-checking of infrastructure and available funding is part of this work, allowing him 
to make judgements about the likelihood of Eskom‟s projections being realised. 
The new contract 
The SHS programme had its last roll-out of new installations in 2006; between 2006 and 2010 
political issues prevented further roll-outs. The political issues evolved partly around the tender 
process for a new contract. Legally, with a new contract every company would be given the 
opportunity to apply for the contract. Practically, however, the appointment of new companies would 
significantly complicate the programme as the existing customers have 20-year service agreements 
with the current concession companies and the new companies would have to operate in the same 
areas. This would confuse customers and probably municipalities as well.  
When the tender process for the contract in 2010 finally went through, it turned out that the existing 
concession companies did not have much competition, and the tender process was won by three of 
the existing concession companies. Nura, Ilitha Co-operative and Solar Vision are contracted to 
install new systems in 2010. This current roll-out is already behind schedule due to delays in 
processes, and the concession companies expressed their worries about the deadline. The DOE is 
also interested in spending the allocated money in time, as this is expected to support the 
programme‟s argument for more funding in the following year.  
The allocation of SHS areas 
In 2007, the DOE commissioned a study on the programme and found that the installations are very 
scattered due to the fact that some households were able to pay the application fees and others not.  
The plan to densify installations needs to include a solution to this problem – probably the abolition 
of application fees to registered indigent households. This, however, requires the municipalities to 
keep their indigent register up to date, which the DOE sees as a challenge for the municipalities.  
The DOE generally has agreements with the concession companies; which have then agreements 
with the local municipalities. The conditions of the agreements between the DOE and the concession 
companies tend to be the same for each company, with only the expected output numbers differing. 
The municipalities in the SHS programme remain those chosen in 1999. Initially, Eskom managed 
the concessioners, but now the DOE has taken this over and agreements are signed between the DOE 
and the concession companies directly. Eskom is meant to collaborate with the municipalities in 
planning the electrification roll-out. Politics in the municipalities are said to put stress on this 
collaboration sometimes – when, for example, a municipal manager wants village A to be electrified 
first (which might add costs), the electrification of village B is then delayed, and in the end the 
budget might not allow village B to be electrified at all during that financial plan (covering three 
years). 
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As the SHS programme is meant to be rolled out only in remote areas which will not be electrified in 
the near future, it faces the need to allocate new areas for the roll-out in the coming years. The off-
grid manager is therefore trying to approach the South African map from the points of least likely 
electrification to the likely ones. 2011‟s local elections are a current constraint to his work, as he 
finds that politics influences the commitments of municipalities.  
Payment by municipalities 
On the issue of the monthly payments from the municipalities to the concession companies; the DOE 
is not obliged to put any pressure on the municipalities, as the money is meant to be paid under the 
Free Basic Electricity budget out of the unconditional grant municipalities receive for Free Basic 
Services. 
In the interview, the off-grid manager mentioned that the DOE is considering motivating the 
concession companies to take legal action against non-paying municipalities, as non-payment is a 
violation of agreements.  
In Limpopo, the Energy Forum meetings are said to be very useful in keeping municipalities and 
their staff informed about the electrification processes in the area and also the progress in the SHS 
programme. Solar Vision, located in Limpopo and attending these meetings regularly, is in fact one 
of the two companies that does not have problems with non-payment of municipalities. Energy 
Forum meetings have been initiated by the DOE in all provinces and are still alive in North-West 
and the Free State on different levels (local government, district and province). In the Eastern Cape 
and KwaZulu-Natal, where such meetings are not taking place, collaboration with the municipalities 
is problematic for the concession companies (the exception being KES in the Eastern Cape which 
receives the monthly service fees for most of their installations directly from the DOE). 
Additional, it was mentioned that some municipalities disagree with the DOE appointing the 
concession companies; they complain that they do not even know the concession company so why 
should they pay them?  
The future of the SHS programme 
The greater goal of the SHS programme was said to be to survive and to further densify SHS 
installations. As funding is apparently not a problem, the simple identification of suitable areas is the 
major constraint to growth for the programme. The DOE is considering collaborating with the 
internal Energy Efficiency Unit which is working with the solar water heating (SWH) programme -   
the thought relates to the possibility of installing SHSs in combination with SWHs on people‟s roofs, 
but the practicalities of finding houses which both have access to piped water and are not electrified 
are difficult.  
In the urban context, the off-grid programme struggles to offer ideas for non-electrified houses as the 
electrification policy does not allow electrification through a SHS when electricity lines are in 
visible distance. Also SHSs are only allowed to be installed in areas where in the next five years 
electricity will not be rolled out. The DOE is currently evaluating whether this latter provision could 
be changed to three years.  
Another constraint to the successful roll-out and support of the SHS programme is the fear of 
municipalities that by agreeing to SHS electrification future grid-electrification would be abandoned. 
A collaborative meeting with Eskom, the municipalities and the DOE (one like the Limpopo Energy 
Forum) for the organisation of the electrification roll-out would help get everyone on the same page 
and explain technical and financial constraints to the municipalities and get their support for the SHS 
programme. 
Local councillors are another crucial influence to the process of convincing people and 
municipalities about the SHS programme. Councillors are said to often not understand or not even be 
aware of the SHS programme. Again, Energy Forum meetings at different levels would address this 
issue. The KES concession apparently has appointed a promotion service provider who is informing 
councillors and presumably also potential customers about the programme. The KES concession is 
managed by Ms Molomo, who is the manager of renewable energy in the Department of Energy; the 
other concession areas fall under the responsibility of the off-grid manager. The reasons for this 
allocation of responsibility are unclear. 
Finally, the off-grid manager reported that the Department of Energy was motivating him to find 
ways to provide households with stronger SHSs which could deliver enough electricity to run a 
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colour TV and which could even be integrated into the grid-supply once a house is electrified. Other 
off-grid approaches could also be integrated into the work of the off-grid team, but the only example 
is a failed mini-grid pilot installation somewhere in KwaZulu Natal. Apparently the maintenance and 
operation of the system was not well planned and education of the users was also lacking, so that the 
project failed (Martinot, 2001). 
5. Summary of the challenges the programme faces 
Operation areas 
The concession companies are dependent on the allocation of implementation areas by the DOE. 
With increasing electrification, existing customers are lost and the DOE is slow in identifying new 
areas and convincing municipalities to take part in the programme. As described by the off-grid 
manager, this process is proving difficult due to Eskom‟s dependency on the municipalities. The 
planning process of the municipalities is apparently quite susceptible to changes and the 
reintroduction of the SHS programme with the new contract is confronting them with additional 
planning problems (Khoza, 2010).  
According to the DOE, work is being done on improving the collaboration between Eskom, the 
municipalities and the DOE in order to better integrate the off-grid and the grid programmes (Khoza, 
2010).  
Points of contact with customers 
The three companies which have been part of the programme from the outset and have also been 
engaged with installing SHS, from the start established energy stores which support their business. 
Solar Vision, which is only operating two stores does not value the contribution as highly as do KES 
and Nura, which  have five or six stores as an important feature of their concept. 
Maintenance of existing systems 
It has proven to not be possible to run a financially viable concession company by providing 
maintenance service alone. The three companies with a sole maintenance mandate are the ones 
struggling most, but one of them won an installation contract for 2010 and now has the chance to 
continue in business. The non-payment of the municipalities and their arguing around indigent 
registers are difficult as well. It seems as if the three full mandated companies find maintenance not 
so difficult, and they do not depend on it so much either. 
Electrification 
A lack of communication and honesty between Eskom, the municipalities, the DOE and the SHS 
companies creates a serious barrier to accessing reliable information on the extension of the national 
electricity grid. Especially the local councillors need to be informed about these plans in order to 
motivate the people in their areas accordingly. The councillors‟ involvement is seen as crucial for the 
openness of households to SHS. The priority list for electrification does not change once approved. 
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Collaboration with municipalities 
Monthly contributions to the service fees are meant to be paid by the municipalities to the 
concession companies for each SHS customer in the area, as shown in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1: Finance stream in the SHS programme 
 
Collaboration with the municipalities is for almost all of the concession companies a major 
challenge. The reasons for Shine the Way dropping out of the business are not known, but Summer 
Sun Trading had to stop operating due to the permanent failure of the municipalities to pay the 
monthly maintenance fees. Ilitha Co-operative and Nura complain about irregular payments as well. 
Only Solar Vision and KES are receiving regular payments from almost all of the involved 
municipalities. In the Limpopo case, Solar Vision and the DOE state that the regular Energy Forum 
meetings are key to the satisfying collaboration between the concession company and the 
municipalities. KES says its general satisfaction with the collaboration with the municipalities is the 
result of meetings with the financial and the municipal managers, and community workshops.  
Summer Sun Trading expressed great concern about the risk of Ilitha not succeeding with the new 
contract if the conditions remain the same. Both companies identified the municipal managers as key 
figures who need to be convinced of the programme each time there is a change in personnel in the 
municipalities. Without the personal buy-in of the manager, Ilitha reckons that even signed contracts 
are meaningless, as payments will simply not come through. This reflects the general lack of 
awareness about solar technology and the SHS programme in particular. From the local councillors 
to the municipal manager, the programme needs to better known. Summer Sun Trading is therefore 
requesting the DOE to play a bigger role and also to apply pressure on non-paying municipalities. 
The future of the concession companies  
The concession companies, regardless of whether they benefited from the last installation contract in 
2006, expressed the need for more frequent contracts. Between 2006 and 2010, the DOE has not 
subsidised additional SHSs due to political issues which are described in more detail in the interview 
with Sebastian Khoza. Previous research reckons that “these delays have damaged the programme, 
and adversely affected its potential beneficiaries. Lengthy periods of uncertainty about whether or 
not the programme would go ahead have done little for investor confidence. Lost opportunities and 
associated opportunity costs for customers must also have been substantial” (Gostner, 2005). The 
new contract is based on an 80/20 principle which implies that the costs are to 80% covered by the 
subsidy and the remaining 20% are the responsibility of the concession company 
The concession companies were asked to judge/rank their interaction with communities, customers 
and local government. They were asked for the quality of infrastructure in form of roads, quality of 
expertise and knowledge and of leadership and management in their team. The graph below 
indicates that the interaction with communities is ranked from good, through problematic to 
unsatisfying, with Solar Vision, KES and Nura being most in favour of the communities they work 
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with and Summer Sun Trading the least. The satisfaction with the interaction with customers differs 
only little between the companies, good and problematic are the two almost equally chosen 
categories. The interaction with local government, however, reflects the findings in this report very 
clearly. Solar Vision is the only company judging this interaction as excellent; the other companies 
chose problematic and unsatisfying. The road quality differs a lot between the concession areas with 
Nura calling the conditions terrible, KES and Ilitha finding them problematic and Sun Trading and 
Solar Vision enjoying good roads. The quality of leadership/management and expertise and 
knowledge was ranked by all companies that answered the question as good. 
 
 
Figure 2: Ranking of business influencing factors 
6. Recommendations resulting from the findings  
a) Attend to the customers without access to maintenance services for their SHS since Summer Sun 
Trading and Shine the Way stopped operating. 
b) Revive Energy Forum meetings in KZN and the Eastern Cape and consider Forum suggestions 
regarding suitable areas for SHS roll-outs. 
c) Investigate cell phones as a possible option for collecting monthly service fees from households. 
d) Consider the inclusion of smaller SHS systems and other solar household appliances like solar 
lanterns to diversify the product range and potentially increase the number of customers, as this 
would reduce maintenance fees and poorer households could participate as well.  
e) Investigate funding opportunities through the Free Basic Alternative Energy Policy/Budget.  
f) Create momentum for the inclusion of SHS electrification into the Universal Access Plan for 
2012/2013. 
g) Identify an appropriate agent/agency to control the programme and have the competence to 
sanction stakeholders in case of non-compliance with guidelines. 
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7. The findings in the international context 
The World Bank/GEF report from 2001 identified certain elements of SHS projects being eminent in 
projects all over the world. Some of these appear also in the South African projects. Projects here 
should also be designed to overcome a) a lack of established markets; b) the unwillingness of 
utilities to provide off-grid electricity services; c) high first-cost and affordability issues; d) lack of 
consumer financing; and e) uncertain or unrealistic grid expansion plans. The reality, however, 
shows that up to now none of these barriers has been overcome.  
As in China where the ESCO model failed because an appropriate authority to regulate the 
concessions could not be found (World Bank, GEF, 2001), the regulation of the SHS programme in 
South Africa is a major concern. To date, the DOE as the managing agent of the programme has not 
been able to ensure payments through the municipalities to the concession companies nor has a way 
been found to effectively integrate the SHS programme into the national electrification plans. It 
seems as if Eskom is still to learn what in Sri Lanka has apparently succeeded, the integration of 
SHS into rural electrification planning. This needs to be improved in South Africa, and the issue 
around unrealistic political promises also calls for greater attention when it comes to electrification. 
“Lessons from early experience suggest that concession tariff-setting, bidding and regulation present 
numerous challenges and require substantial time and resources. Projects must recognize the link 
between rural electric-grid extension and solar home system demand; customers‟ perceptions of 
future rural electric grid extensions, whether based upon concrete government plans or merely 
unrealistic political promises, can limit demand for solar home systems. Thus clear, open and 
realistic rural electrification policies can help create and/or stabilize market demand” (Martinot, 
2001). 
None of the South African concession companies has been able to establish a cost-effective way of 
collecting the monthly service fees from the households. In Sri Lanka, a company which initially 
worked under a concession scheme had to give up, as the costs to collect the monthly fees in the  
scarcely populated rural areas simply were too high (Martinot, 2001). 
“The key elements of a sustainable rural PV market include customer satisfaction, affordability, 
dealer profitability, and effective supply and service chains” (Martinot, 2001). The World Bank and 
GEF document the success of firms with rural experience and distribution infrastructure, and in line 
with these KES and Nura are the strongest companies in South Africa. They both have a number of 
stores and collect the monthly fees with certain stringency.  
It can be concluded that South Africa‟s experiences with the SHS concession programme are very 




This research would not have been possible without the openness and time of the concession 
managers. Each of them made the effort to meet for the interview and took the time to respond to the 
questions. Special thanks go to Sebastian Khoza from the Department of Energy who in his function 
as the off-grid manager shed light on issues concerning the high level management of the SHS 
program. It has been a very interesting journey through the country‟s concession areas made possible 
by UNITAR and everyone involved. Thank you! 
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